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Acquisition reform has been ongoing since the Civil War, to improve the management of the weapons procurement process. 2 The acquisition process has been faulted for not adequately addressing immature technologies ("unproven" in the President's words), requirements changes in the midst of a program, and the uncontrolled costs of a program's affordability. 3 In 2008, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) assessed 96 programs with an average cost growth of 26 percent over initial acquisition costs, 44 percent with an increase in per unit cost greater than 25 percent and an average schedule delay of 21 months. 4 Cost overruns and schedule delays are indications that programs are complex and difficult to manage as measured against initial baseline cost and schedule estimates. Cost and schedule growth are symptoms of underlying issues that add risk to program management. Program risk in three areas will be examined with regard to using immature technology, expanding requirements and the inability to meet affordability goals.
This research paper examines the risk management process within the defense acquisition process. The risk management process will be defined as understood by the Defense Acquisition University, which is the training institution for the acquisition career field within the Department of Defense. 5 
Risk Management
The risk management process will be examined for the ability to address technology risk, requirements change, and the cost or affordability of programs.
Risk is a measure of future uncertainty in the ability or inability to achieve program objectives within costs, schedule, and technical performance parameters. 6 Risk has two components, a present probability that a future risk will occur and a consequence or effect if that future risk occurs. 7 So, risk management is about managing future events, and is not about managing current issues or present problem solving. 8 Risk management is about prioritization and concentrating program resources on the high impact, high probability risk.
9
Risk management consists of four major steps that examine risk: risk planning, risk assessment, risk handling and risk tracking (see figure 1 ). Risk planning is concerned with implementing a strategy that develops a team-based, collaborative process, a documented and agreed upon method to identify, categorize, track and revisit risks throughout the life cycle of a program. A plan should include a method to address level of severity, probability of occurrence, and responsibilities of team members, and frequency of meeting. The plan should also document how to initiate
As such, it proactively informs the Program
Manager on where to spend valuable resources, money, time, people or technology, rather than reacting to problems as they arise. Risk management is a continuous process of managing perceived future risk to the program by a multi-function team. 26 Risk management does not replace the attention to detail and structured decision process required in well managed acquisition programs. 27 Analyses of defense and public sector infrastructure programs demonstrate that all programs have risk and that risk is manageable. 28 Cost and Schedule variance are common program management metrics used to monitor program progress. 29 The manifestations of risk as schedule delays, cost increases or performance shortfalls are common to all large projects; defense and public sector. 30 In the major studies of defense related programs, risk is categorized into three areas that the program managers may be able to influence: technology selection and use, realistic requirements generation and producibility or cost effectiveness. 31 
Technology Risk
Technology risk is risk associated with choosing technologies, integration of technologies or software development, or manufacturing technologies. Within the DOD, the technology risk for major parts of programs are assessed by ranking the technology against a preset scale from one to nine in defined technology readiness levels (TRL), with nine being the most mature and proven technology in real mission environments and one being basic research. 32 To be assessed as a mature technology ready for the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase, a TRL level of six or above is desired, prior to entering into system development. 33 To illustrate technology risk, consider five programs, consisting of the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), a deep strike missile, Javelin, an anti-tank missile, the Future Combat System (FCS), a suite of systems, the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), a guidance package for unguided bombs, and the F-22 Raptor, an advanced tactical fighter. The technology risk for these programs will be examined in terms of programmatic symptoms of risk in schedule and cost impacts and program restructures. Launch Rocket System (MLRS) rocket programs, which have been in development production since 1983. 35 All of these are proven TRL level 9 technologies that were incorporated into the early stages of the ATACMS program. 36 Likewise, JDAM used more mature technology at the outset, over 85 percent of the JDAM components were from commercial sources already producing the technology.
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In contrast, Javelin, FCS and the F-22 had several immature technologies on entry into the equivalent EMD phase. Javelin entered EMD with no critical technologies at TRL level 6. 38 The Javelin program was using a single-step program within EMD to achieve a revolution in seeker technology with imaging infrared and software-driven automatic target tracking and engagement, and a missile with soft-launch capability, neither of which was available at the beginning of the program. 39 As a consequence, the Javelin program's development schedule was lengthened by 2 years and cost growth was 150 percent higher than the initial baseline. 40 
Requirements Risk
Requirements risk is often due to requirements instability. Requirements instability is represented as poorly defined and changing requirements during the development of the system. In DOD and intelligence community (IC) programs, requirements instability has contributed directly to cost and schedule growth. 49 In the case of the Space-Based Infrared System High (SBIRS-High), new requirements were being added well into development, and were poorly defined at the start of development. 50 A billion dollar cost growth to the program was attributed to requirements growth and definition. 51 In the FCS program, three years into product development (2006), system level requirements were still in flux. 52 Requirements should be well defined at Milestone B. In the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) communications satellite program, cost growth of $0.72 billion was attributed to requirements that were added to the program after May of 2000. 53 In the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) Common Ground Station (CGS), not only were requirements added, two versions of the station, a light and medium, were added to the program after development was underway. 54 One version was terminated for affordability reasons after a few years in development. 55 In a study of 13 Army programs, those that experienced requirements changes in mid development experienced 50 percent less favorable performance outcomes than those programs that did not experience requirements changes. 56 Favorable performance outcomes were defined as meeting technical requirements and cost and schedule goals.
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Requirements instability impacts program cost and sometimes schedule growth.
However, holding requirements firm, resisting increases in requirements, and holding life cycle times to short time periods, improve the chances of program performance on cost and schedule. 58 Those programs that met cost and schedule goals were able to achieve two outcomes: short development times and clearly defined requirements at program development start.
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The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is the DOD requirements approval and definition process that approves major defense acquisition program requirements.
Requirements as a source of instability should be considered within the context of risk planning and an effort made to control increases to existing well defined requirements. 60 The JCIDS process has been characterized as slow to achieve approval as well as being service parochial. 61 Most programs are validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). 62 The requirements approval process is not linked with the ability of the acquisition community to provide feasible technology within funding constraints. 63 DOD is implementing a Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) review at program initiation to examine technology feasibility and affordability, as outlined in the 2008 DOD Instruction 5000.02. 64 Efforts at linking the funding, requirements and acquisition processes for better informed decision making have potential to improve the complex environment that procures materiel for the forces.
Producibility Risk
Producibility is defined as meeting cost and schedule goals. Risk increases when costs or schedules increase buying less weapon systems for the funding spent.
Several GAO reports have demonstrated program cost growth is due to requirements instability or technology immaturity or both and that cost growth is a symptom of these underlying causes. 65 In general, cost growth in a program is identified by schedule delays, increased costs per unit production, or less production for the funding. 66 The FCS and F-22 programs demonstrated cost growth from immature technologies.
Requirements increases affected the cost of several satellite programs. 67 The cost increase has in a number of programs resulted in fewer production end items that increase the average per unit procurement cost (AUPC). 68 Other factors that may contribute to growth in AUPC, are unrealistic initial costs driven by the "low-bid" syndrome. The low bid syndrome is the desire by a contractor to procure the contract by producing an unrealistic baseline cost for the development of the program. 69 The consolidation of the defense industry may be exacerbating the bidding process. The bid process may not be an accurate reflection of the true cost of the program. Another possible cause of increased AUPC is the financial instability. If the program was funded, and that funding was reduced from external causes, the AUPC will increase when less funding is available and quantities are reduced. 70 Other effects from funding instability include personnel turnover and testing schedule changes that often result in increasing costs or schedules or both.
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Cost and schedule increases to program affordability are not themselves root causes of affordability risk. The identification with root causes for affordability risks are Affordability is impacted by funding stability, outside intervention into a programs funding, the low-bid process.
essential in being able to determine the increasing lack of affordability in DOD weapons acquisition programs. The identification of the root cause of the funding instability aides in determination of risk mitigation actions. For example, like the FCS and F-22, the Stryker and Javelin programs experienced affordability issues. In the Stryker program technical armor and weight issues with the Mobile Gun System (MGS) were the root cause of cost increase. 72 In the Javelin program, the seeker technology maturity was the root causes of the program affordability issues.
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The Planning Programming Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) system also has impacts. In the case of the F-22 the AUPC was pushed upward by decisions to decrease from 750 to 648 aircraft in 1990, and then to 442 in 1994, and then to 339 in 1997 when congress imposed a cost limit to production for affordability reasons as costs for the program continued to rise.
Both programs had cost and schedule increases. The cost and schedule increases are metrics that allow a program manager to track affordability risk of weapons programs and should be monitored as indicators. They can be risk mitigated, by allocating management funding reserves and time reserves in the early planning of the schedule. 74 The final numbers were based on existing budget and capped the program at 187, with the recommendation of Defense Secretary
Gates. 75 
Risk Management and Managerial Influence
Both program costs and decisions from outside the program office increased the AUPC.
In a few cases, programs have managed to achieve performance cost and schedule outcomes. In those cases that achieved favorable outcomes, JDAM, ATACMS and MRAP, risk mitigation strategies that contributed to favorable results will be examined.
JDAM employed a number of techniques at risk mitigation. One was to ensure that the program held a rigid mission performance and requirements process consisting of seven fixed and untradeable Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) to avoid increases or changes in requirements. 76 This approach requires two methods, a well defined initial set of requirements as a baseline, and no new requirements after the Preliminary Design Review (PDR). 77 Another technique employed by the JDAM program was to rigorously avoid any effort at over-design from the contractor development, using 85 percent commercial and government off-the-shelf technologies. 78 The use of these technologies also contributed to the ability of the program to use mostly mature technologies. 79 Affordability risk was controlled through a rigid cost control program that added Average Unit Production Price (AUPP) as a KPP. 80 The use of commercial or GOTS sources provided the government with cost benefit trades and alternatives to meet the AUPP KPP. 81 JDAM implemented two processes under acquisition reform that transferred risk to the contractor: configuration control and a warranty.
The affordability of JDAM using average unit price may be because JDAM is an expendable package with low-to-no maintenance needs. 82 The contractor was responsible to maintain designs, and to provide a warranty on performance of 20 years shelf live and 5 years service life, accepting the risk of maintaining quality to comply with the warranty. 83 The use of Integrated Process Teams (IPTs) in close partnership with industry to provide immediate feedback on performance from both test programs and design performance enabled changes on the contractors' designs to reduce cost and increase performance. 84 The IPT process paid dividends when the program underwent the only restructuring as a result of flight instability on the Mk-83 and BLU-109 JDAM kits discovered in testing, delaying kits for about one year. 85 The IPTs resolved the flight instability. As will be shown later this same process provided benefits on MRAP. The Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) is another missile program that used similar techniques, like using proven technology in the engine and imaging sensor, solidifying requirements, and making cost a KPP, all of which achieved similar results. 86 ATACMS used technologies that were very mature, TRL levels of 6 or higher, with many at TRL level 9, having been borrowed from the MLRS program. ATACMS uses a modular independent architecture compatible with the M270A1 and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) fire control and launchers, building on the MLRS program. 87 The use of mature technologies, a well defined and limited set of requirements and the short duration of the program aided the ATACMS program office in achieving production on schedule and within budget. 88 ATACMS experienced no late engineering changes, achieved system unit costs, met the program technical requirements, and experienced no significant issues during deployment. 89 The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle program implemented a risk management strategy to mitigate risk to the program. 90 In order to achieve production quantities, multiple vendors with multiple designs were needed. 91 The test and evaluation program was designed as a risk reduction and mitigation part of the program. 92 The test and evaluation was designed to test the most critical capabilities first, followed by others later. 93 As part of the process, contractor-IPTs were conducted by the program office to identify any changes that could be incorporated into the designs for the next block of production, so a test-fix-test program was used to provide risk reduction. 94 Also, MRAP identified two material flows early in the development that could impede production -domestic armor supply and tires rated to fifteen tons. 95 Law requires that domestic armor be procured for military vehicles from either domestic suppliers or Canada. 96 The program obtained a waiver to procure armor from overseas vendors in order to achieve production quantities. 97 Tires were another risk identified.
The program approached a second manufacturer to produce additional tires, and approached the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to produce more tire molds. 98 Both were needed to produce tires for production and as spares as MRAP vehicles were fielded.
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MRAP had other material requirements and approached the DOD to receive a DX rating to compete with other major programs for materials and spares. 100 The 
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The program manager can achieve cost and schedule goals as demonstrated by the JDAM, ATACMS and MRAP case studies. However, significant factors influence the ability of DOD and the program manager to achieve those goals. Funding stability so that the program is not required to be a "program promoter" to secure funding for the program in the annual funding cycle of DOD would help promote stability. 105 The incentive structure is currently based on schedule, cost and performance success, not necessarily valid projections of risk or difficulty or providing a valid program baseline. 106 The tenure and attraction of talent are also dependent on stable funding and the personnel and management chains on projects should remain in place from the inception of the project through the development phase, as industry practices. 107 The DOD acquisition management chain approves through the requirements process more programs than DOD is able to afford. The DOD acquisition management chain should examine portfolio management as a means of providing funding decisions on the services' acquisition programs, using the QDR process to determine programs that will receive funding over the long term to provide funding stability.
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Accountability is also important in both public sector and defense programs, to insure public sector funds are achieving the performance and requirements originally designed for the programs. Oversight is a government responsibility and should be a function of the program office; the program office should be the program monitor, not the program promoter. 109 Several reforms to achieve more accountability are to ensure the government is providing oversight on the program, not promoting the program, and to adopt industry practices for program accountability by assuring the program management is in place for the duration of the development of the program. 110 
Conclusions
Risk management and early decision making need to go hand in hand. Most of the crucial decisions are made in the early phase of development, prior to milestone B.
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The three areas examined, technology, requirements and producibility are important risks to be examined in a program. The program manager and decision makers' ability to manage and control requirements is possible with courageous decisions to not allow programs to enter EMD with either poorly defined requirements or those that cannot be easily translated into technical and system solutions, and to hold requirements firm over definitive time periods. In cases where system development may take significantly longer than four or five years, evolutionary acquisition with additional milestones may help control requirements instability. Albeit, not solely in the domain of the program manager, requirements growth should be discouraged once Good decision processes must accompany good risk mitigation strategies and acquisition strategies require tailoring to the complexity and needs of the program;
however, some commonalities exist. Technology risk in the form of technology immaturity and requirements risk in form of poorly defined or changing requirements have occurred in a number of programs generating cost and schedule overruns.
Although producibility risk occurs and may be risk mitigated, more often, cost and schedule variances are evidence of underlying issues such as technology immaturity or requirements instability.
EMD begins. Likewise, with technology immaturity, risk may be controlled by measuring technology maturity and only allowing programs to enter EMD with TRL levels of 6 or higher for significant portions of the critical technologies.
Cost and schedule overruns occur on other than defense related projects.
Railroad, highway and other large infrastructure projects such as canals and opera houses are typically over cost by significant margins, from anywhere on cost to as much as 200 percent overruns. 112 Large software projects experience similar overruns. 113 In many of these projects, as demonstrated here for defense projects, optimistic projections of value and use are at the root cause of the inflated viability of the projects.
As in public sector large projects, complex defense projects are overly optimistic in the expected costs and ability of technology to provide leaps in performance in the early stages of development. 114 For transportation infrastructure projects, optimism results in a belief in unrealistic forecasts of usage, undervaluing environmental impacts, and overinflating the regional economic benefits for transportation and large infrastructure projects. 115 The development of a risk management plan based on the most likely scenarios as opposed to the-everything-goes-according-to-plan approach is recommended in order to provide more realism in the cost estimation of the project. 116 Managing risks can help programs achieve goals on cost, schedule and performance. Ultimately, the government benefits from the proper use of risk management to prepare for and mitigate risk to programs. By achieving these goals, the DOD is better prepared to estimate total program cost. The defense department can achieve better project performance with risk management. By including risk analysis, the feasibility of a project based on realistic costs over the life of the project will provide a better estimation of the total cost of the program or project over the program's life cycle. The Norwegian defense agency is adopting just such an approach.
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The DOD acquisition system is not meant to be, nor should it be, a "one size fits all" approach. Software development is different from large infrastructure building development is different from technologically mature weapons systems is different from technologically complex systems. Tailoring 
Recommendations for Further Investigation
In some of the case studies examined, the decision processes that have allowed programs with poorly defined or changing requirements or immature technologies to enter into EMD is an area of investigation that would be beneficial to DOD. The implication of the FCS program is that the program was entered into EMD with poorly defined requirements and immature technologies, and both were known prior to entry into EMD. The decision processes that lead to these conditions should be examined.
Some research infers that the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES) and program advocacy by program acquisition personnel lead to poor decision analysis with Milestone Decision Authorities (MDA). 118 Others suggest that risk adverse managers are driving poor decisions and that the system promotes limited information flow to decision makers. 119 Some analyses have correlated funding instability with personnel turnover.
Budget driving decisions and success oriented programs are areas in need of further investigation. The volume of contractual, legal and acquisition oversight complicates approvals of program documentation and has impacts on schedules. 121 An area of study would be the impacts of congressional intervention that micro-manages the system with oversight processes and the impacts of those interventions on the program success. figure 1 of the risk management cycle exist, in the Defense Acquisition University guides and in the Project Management literature. All infer a cycle and various others move subordinate steps in the risk assessment process to major steps in the risk management cycle. I chose this cycle because the prioritization steps are subordinate to the Assessment phase, also called analysis by other sources. 11 Ibid, 58-59. Planning for a well executed and run risk management program is a complex management endeavor. Also see the DAU risk management guides referenced early as well as other program risk management sources cited in these endnotes for a more comprehensive review of risk management planning. 12 The areas addressed in a risk management planning were compiled from: • Richard B. Barber, "Understanding Internally Generated Risks in Projects,"
International Journal of Project Management, 23, (2005), 588.
• 21 Veselenak, "The Value of Risk Management in Acquisition Planning," 62-63. This sets the risk management matrix into a green, amber, red or stoplight format and begins to highlight those amber and above for risk mitigation. For example, a risk may have a cost impact to the program and the program may establish the scale at little to no impact (less than 0.5% cost growth), 1%, 5% (usually the amber level is set at 3), 10% and greater than 10%. The scales may be linear or logarithmic and may address any of the risk categories previously mentioned. The rankings are on a scale to provide a matrix for managing risk from least likely to most likely to occur (or probability) and from no impact to a highly severe impact (or consequence or severity). The severity is usually assigned to broad categories of cost, schedule or performance, and sometimes other elements of the WBS. 22 The Risk Reporting Matrix is compiled from four sources.
• Aerospace Corporation, Risk Management Quick Reference Card, 2003, 1-2.
• National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Systems Engineering Handbook, (Washington DC: NASA Center for Aerospace Information, Hanover, MD, December 2007), 139-150.
• U.S. Defense Acquisition University, RISK MANAGEMENTGUIDE FOR DOD ACQUISITION, sixth edition, 11-17.
• Institute of Risk Management (IRM), A Risk Management Standard, (London, UK: IRM, 2002), 6-8.
Many of the scales are in five levels. Risk Matrices are about visual presentation, to rapidly identify the high probability, high consequence (red), medium probability, medium consequence (amber), and lower consequence, lower probability (green) risks. As you can see in the table with definitions, the consequence levels may be in many different forms, but the probability is usually a percentage of likely occurrences. The schema may be more elaborate as the risk situation necessitates and the plan should have a consequence and probability scale for each risk. In general, the amber or red risks are identified for some form of action. Even a green risk may be monitored if the risk is judged to be such a high consequence to the program that the item will need to be monitored. In general, this allows a quick pictorial stoplight chart that quickly identifies those risks that are being addressed. This pictorial is not static. Mitigation plans may indeed reduce the probability and so the risk itself becomes less of an issue for the program. For large programs, the risks are identified by number and placed on the chart and movement is tracked to indicate increasing or decreasing probability or consequence as the risk is measured. Ideally you would like to see the risks move from the red quadrants to the green.
